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COMMENTS
COMPLETE TRANSPLANTATION OF THE
ADOPTED CHILD-A PLAN
FOR CALIFORNIA
By DAvm PomERENm*
IN June 1966, in Estate of Goulartl it was held that the brothers and
sisters of an adopting parent can be classified as "strangers," t.e., class
D transferees2 for inheritance tax purposes when succeeding to the
estate of their brother's adopted child.3
Less than three years before, in Estate of Goulart, the same court
had ruled that after adoption the "andred" of an adopted person are
his adopted relatives and not his biological ones. 5
The earlier Goulart decision indicated that the adoption created a
completely new familial relation while the second decision recognized
only a partial integration of the adoptee into the adoptive family The
conflict in these cases is a result of an inconsistency in the treatment of
* Member, Second Year Class.
1242 A.C.A. 950, 51 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1966).
2 CAL. Bxv. & TAx. CODE §§ 13307-10 classify the transferees for inheritance tax
purposes. Sections 15110-13 use the same categories to classify transferees for gift tax
purposes. A class A transferee is granted a $5000 exemption plus the most favorable tax
rate. Class A transferees are the spouse, lineal issue (including adoptees) and lineal
ancestors of the decedent. Class B transferees receive a $2000 exemption and are the
brothers and sisters of decedent and their descendants. Class C transferees are the
brothers and sisters of decedent's parents and their descendants. They receive a $500
exemption. Everyone not included within the other sections is a class D transferee and
is given a $50 exemption. The tax exemptions are established by §§ 13801-04. The tax
rates are set by §§ 13404-07. These rates are progressive, the larger the inheritance, the
higher the tax rate. The beginning rate for a class A transferee is 2%, while B, C aiid
D transferees begin paying 6%, 7% and 10% respectively. The maximum paid by a
class A transferee is 10% (on the excess clear market value of the transfer over $500,000)
while the B, C and D transferees pay a maximum of 18%, 18% and 24% respectively.
On a transfer of property with a clear market value of $5000 the class A transferee
pays no tax, the B transferee pays $180, the C transferee $315 and the class D transferee
pays $495.
Where the transfer has a value of $50,000 the class A transferee pays $1150, the
B $3880, the C $4715 and the class D transferee pays $6245.
SThis decision was based entirely on Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 13309-10.
The court recognized that Probate Code treatment of the adoptee differs 'from the
Revenue Code treatment, but said that different objectives prevail in the two areas. See
text accompanying note 38 mnfra.
4222 Cal. App. 2d 808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963).
s The decision in this case is based entirely on PROnATE CODE §§ 92 and 257. See
text following note 25 znfra.
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adoption among the California Civil, 6 Probate7 and Revenue and Taxa-
tion Codes." It is the purpose of this comment to discuss these mcon-
sistencies and to propose a method of resolution.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The history of the treatment of the adopted child in California has
been amply discussed elsewhere.9 Suffice it to say here that until 1955
the cases recognized that adoption established the legal relation of
parent and child'0 and terminated the legal relationship with the bio-
logcal parents." But the adoption did not change the child's relation-
ship with reference to anyone other than his biological and adoptive
parents.
By recognizing only parental substitution, and therefore denying
any new legal rights beyond the parent-child relationslp, the law ex-
cluded the adoptee from full participation in the adoptive family The
injustice of this treatment was made clear in a 1955 case, Estate of
Calhoun.3 The legislature responded quickly, amending Probate Code
section 257 to give the adopted child the status of a "descendant of
one who has adopted him, the same as a natural child, for all purposes
of succession by, from, or through the adopting parent.""' The amend-
ment put California in accord with the trend to transplant the child
from his natural family into his adoptive family. 5
EXPANSION OF RIGHTS
The amended statute terminated all rights of intestate succession
between the child and his biological relatives"' and granted him full
6 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 228-29.
7 CAL. PNoB. CODE § 257.
8 CAL. .v. & TAX. CODE §§ 13307-10, 15110-13.
9 See generally Note, 9 HAsTINcs L.J. 326 (1958), Note, 31 So. CAL. L.R. 441
(1958), Note, 18 STAw. L. REv. 494 (1966).10 Estate of Newman, 75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888).
11 Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).
12 Estate of Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916). See Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.
App. 2d 395, 39 P.2d 847 (1934) (adoptee prevented from succeeding to the estate of
his adoptive parent's intestate relative); Estate of Calhoun, 44 Cal. 2d 378, 282 P.2d
880 (1955) (biological relatives permitted to -succeed to the estate of an adopted out
intestate).
18 44 Cal. 2d 378, 282 P.2d 880 (1955). Calhoun, an adopted child, died intestate
survived by an adoptive sister and biological siblings. The adoptee bad a close family
relationship with the adoptive sister and had been separated in fact from his biological
relatives by the adoption. The court determined that the adoptive sister was not the
adoptee's legal sister within the meaning of the succession statutes and ruled that the
biological collaterals were Calhoun's heirs at law.
14 Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1478, § 1, at 2690. The statute also terminates all rights of
intestate succession between an adoptee and his biological relatives.
15 6 PowELL, REAL PRoPaRY F 1004 (1958).
16 Estate of Dolan, 169 Cal. App. 2d 628, 337 P.2d 498 (1959).
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succession rights in the estates of his adoptive relatives.17 Hence, the
adopted child was completely transplanted into the adoptive family
"for all purposes of succession."18 However, at the time of the amend-
ment to the Probate Code there was no corresponding clarification of
the Civil Code "parental substitution" concept, nor was there any
analogous amendment to the Revenue and Taxation Code. 9
In the eleven years since the 1955 amendment the courts have
affirmed the equality of adopted and biological children in a number
of inheritance cases. The right of an adopted child as a taker under a
class gift to "lawful issue" 20 or "children "12 is recognized and regarded
as consistent with the trend "toward making the adopted child a child
of the adopter to all intents and purposes."22 The courts also have held
that the severance of rights of succession from the biological family
prevents an adopted child from being a pretermitted heir of his natural
grandparents.2 3
The 1963 decision in Estate of GoulartA is the broadest application
of complete transplantation yet handed down by the Califorma courts.
The case arose over a bequest by the testatrix, who had been adopted
as an adult, to her natural brother and two natural sisters. Two of
these siblings predeceased her but left lineal descendants. The court
held that the bequest failed and should pass intestate because the de-
ceased brother and sister were not "kindred" within the meaning of
the antilapse statute.2 5 'e believe the public policy of the state is to
give an adopted child the same status as a biological one. and that
in light of this policy, the kLndred of an adopted person are its adop-
tive relatives, not its biological ones."26 The court said that taking
under the antilapse statute was analogous to taking by intestate succes-
sion and therefore Probate Code section 92 could and should be con-
strued in accordance with Probate Code section 257 Although the
court suggested, by way of dictum, that Probate Code section 257 was
intended to accomplish "a complete severance of the former relation-
ship of the adoptee with his biological, relatives,"27 the decision
17 Id. at 629, 337 P.2d at 498 (dictum).
-8 CAL. NhoB. CODE § 257.
iO Sections 13308-09, 15111-12 of the Revenue and Taxation Code were amended
in 1959 to extend the scope of classifications B and C to some adopted transferees. See
notes 53-56 tnfra and accompanying text for a discussion of their limitations.
20 Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957).
21 Estate of Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957).
22 Id. at 139, 315 P.2d at 692.
23Estate of Carey, 214 Cal. App. 2d 39, 29 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1963); Estate of Dille-
hunt, 175 Cal. App. 2d 464, 346 P.2d 245 (1959).
24 222 Cal. App. 2d 808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963).
25 CAL. NOB. CODE § 92 provides that a devise or bequest to predeceased kindred
of the testator does not lapse, but passes to lineal descendants of the devisee or legatee.
26 222 Cal. App. 2d at 824, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
2 Id. at 820, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
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does not extend the section beyond what the court regarded as the
area of intestate succession.
THE INHERITANCE TAX CASES
The next relevant case is Estate of Zook,28 decided in 1964. A testa-
trix bequeathed equal shares of property to her natural grandchildren.
She recognized in her will that two of these grandchildren had been
adopted out of her line by the present husband of her son's ex-wife.
The issue was whether, for inheritance tax purposes, these legatees
were "lineal issue" of the testatrix and therefore class A transferees, or
"strangers" and therefore class D transferees.
The district court of appeal stated that the Revenue and Taxation
Code should be "construed in the light of the 1955 amendment to
Probate Code, section 257 and interpreted in harmony with the present
policy of the law relating to the status of adopted children."0 The
court found the children to be class D transferees, reasoning that the
"adoption resulted in a complete substitution of family and upon its
consummation [these] children departed the Zook family and
entered into the family of their adoptive parent, for all purposes." 0
This decision was vacated by the California Supreme Court in
1965,1' holding that the children were class A transferees. The court
found no affirmative mdication that the legislature intended that there
be total correlation between probate law and taxation law The court
said that in circumstances such as these, i.e., where the grandparent
testatrix, not a party to the adoption, subsequently exhibits a con-
tinuing bond of affection by naming the adopted out child in a will,
the Revenue and Taxation Code must be read in its literal sense, re-
sulting in the transferee being classified as "lineal issue." "[T]he ties
between that child and the testatrix cannot be said to have-been sev-
ered in fact as they have been in law "32 The court recognized that this
interpretation of the Revenue and Taxation Code can result in an
adopted child being a class A transferee of both his adoptive parents
and biological family, but said the resulting detriment to the state is
outweighed by the encouragement offered to the expression of affec-
tion by the child's natural family 33
The Zook decision carefully distinguished the earlier Gouart case
2839 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1964), vacated, 62 Cal. 2d 492, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d
53 (1965).
29 39 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
so ld. at 485.
31 Estate of Zook, 62 Cal. 2d 492, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d 53 (1965).
32 Id. at 495, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 600, 399 P.2d at 56.
33 Id. at 496, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 600, 399 P.2d at 56.
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by finding that "irrespective of any testamentary effect given to section
257 beyond its express language of succession," 4 it is not determinative
of tax classifications of those taking under a will.
In the respondent's petition for rehearing in- Zook, the State Con-
troller indicated that an application of the Zook holding to the fact
situation in Goulart could result in a gain of revenue for the state.85
This did in fact occur.36
Consistent with the Zook decision, the biological sister who took
under the will of Louise Goulart, the adopted testatrix, was taxed as a
class B transferee. The heirs at law of Miss Goulart, biological collat-
erals of her adoptive father, were taxed as class D transferees. This
classification the heirs appealed. The district court of appeal37 said
that the reasoning of the Zook case was readily applicable, to Goulart
and affirmed the holding that the successors were class D transferees.
This decision clearly means that the reference in Revenue and Tax-
ation Code section 13309(a) to "the father or mother of the decedent"
does not include adoptive parents. In situations where there is a closer
personal relationship between heirs and decedent, or where other
general social considerations so warrant, the court suggests that the
literal language of the statute might be extended. But here the fact
that testatrix's will evinced affection only for her biological relatives, 38
that she was adopted as an adult,39 and that there was no evidence
s4Id. at 494, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 599, 399 P.2d at 55.
85 Respondent's Petition for Reheanng, p. 9, Estate of Zook, 62 Cal. 2d 492, Cal.
Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d 53 (1965).
36 Inheritance taxes on the Zook legatees were $5035 less after the children were
held to be class A transferees. Clerk's Transcript, p. 19, Estate of Zook, 62 Cal. 2d 492,
42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d 53 (1965). Taxed as class D transferees, the Goulart heirs
paid $7008 more than they would have paid as class C transferees. After applying the
Zook holding to the Goulart facts the net gain to the state was $1973. Appendix A to
Agreed Statement of Facts on Appeal, Estate of Coulart, 242 A.C.A. 950, 51 Cal. Rptr.
808 (1966).
87 Estate of Coulart, 242 A.C.A. 950, 51 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1966).
38 Revenue and Taxation Code § 13306 defines a transferee as "any person to whom
a transfer is made, [including] any legatee, devisee, heir, next of kin, grantee, donee,
vendee, assignee, successor, survivor or beneficiary." This statute equates all transferees
indicating that one who takes by intestate succession will be taxed equally with one who
takes by will.
The Coulart court used the fact that the heirs were not mentioned in Louise Cou-
lart's will as one of its considerations in determining their inheritance tax classification.
This tax classification, based upon a differentiation between testate and intestate taking,
disregards the clear meaning of § 13306.
39The court indicates that the maturity of Louise Goulart at the time of her adop-
tion is important to the holding of the case. This should not have been determinative.
A person adopted after majority is a class D transferee from his adoptive parents or
ancestors. CAL. IEv. & TAx CoDE §§ 13307(b), (e), 15110(b), (c). However, this is
the only section which decrees different treatment of the adopted adult. The distinction
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of her having known these heirs precluded their being given class
C status. "The legislature has tended to recognize an adoptee as a
lineal descendant for tax purposes, but has not, in its tax enact-
ments, embraced the 'total substitution' theory of Probate Code section
257. "4O
The unfortunate result of this case is that the court has said that at
least in some inheritance tax situations the adoptive father of a child
will not be recognized by the law as his father. The court accepted the
Controller's argument 4' that father or mother means natural father or
mother.42 In its treatment of the adoptive parent-child relationship the
Goulart court not only refused to apply the total substitution doctrine
of Probate Code section 257, but it also disregarded the parental sub-
stitution effects of Civil Code sections 228 and 229.48 Under these
statutes the cases have held for more than fifty years that the adoption
creates a legal parent-child relationship which supersedes the natural
blood relationship.4
Estate of Zook and Estate of Goulart present unusual fact situ-
ations, both in the character of the adoption (stepparent adoption in
Zook, adult adoption in Goulart) and in the relationship of the trans-
feror and transferee involved (testamentary disposition by a biological
ancestor to an adoptee in Zook, testamentary disposition by an adoptee
to a biological collateral in Goulart). In the majority of adoptions,
however, a very young child is placed in the adopting parent's home,
after little contact with his biological parents and less association with
his biological relatives.45 The relatives of the child's adoptive family
are generally the only kmdred he knows. This child clearly deserves
to be treated the same as a natural child in hIs adoptive family And
this the statutes should provide.
is designed to prevent wholesale use of the adoption statutes by persons interested in
gaining a tax advantage for the distribution of an estate. This protection for the state is
not necessary where the adopted adult is a transferor, and the court's use of it has no
statutory basis.
40 242 A.C.A. at 952, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
41 Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Estate of Goulart 242 A.C.A. 950, 51 Cal. Rptr. 808
(1966).
42 242 A.C.A. at 951-52, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
4 3 CAL. Cxv. CO)E § 228 provides: "A child, when adopted, may take the family
name of the person adopting. After adoption, the two shall sustain towards each other
the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all ths
duties of that relation."
CAL. Crv. CoDE § 229 provides: "Effect on former relations of child. The parents of
an adopted child are, from the ime of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties
towards, and all responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have no right over it."
44 Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).
45 See tenBroek, Californt's Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HAsTwNs L.J. 261, 274
(1955).
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STATUTORY TREATMENT OF ADOPTION
Civil Code sections 228 and 229 completely substitute adoptive
parents for natural parents.46 But the Civil Code stops there. It grants
the rights and imposes the duties of the legal relationship of parent
and child but makes no further contribution to the adoptee's integra-
tion into the adoptive family.
The Health and Safety Code provides for amendments to the
child's birth record after the adoption. The child is given a new birth
certificate identical to those registered for the birth of a child of bio-
logical parents,1 completed without reference to the adoption.48 This
new certificate is substituted for the original49 and the original is avail-
able only on an order from the court.8 0 Although these code provisions
do not establish any legal relationship for the child they are definitely
consonant with complete transplantation of the child into the adoptive
family They clearly are designed to protect the adopted child, and
they give him a status in the records exactly equal to that of a bio-
logical child.
The adopted child receives his most complete transplantation un-
der Probate Code section 257 whch gives the adoptee the same status
as a natural child for purposes of intestate succession within his adop-
tive family This right of succession is a reciprocal one, operating
equally to allow his adoptive collaterals to succeed to his estate. When
the legislature granted the adoptee the right to share in the intestate
estates of his adoptive family it also prohibited him from succeeding
to the estate of any biological relative who died intestate. These rela-
tives are also prevented from claiming any inheritance if the adopted
child dies intestate. This creation of rights in the adoptive family and
negation of rights in the natural family puts the adoptee on a com-
pletely equal basis with the natural children in hIs adoptive family
The statute operates to completely transplant the adopted child into
the adoptive family, but only in the area of intestate succession and
those situations analogous to it.ri
As evidenced by the Zook and Goulart decisions, the Revenue and
46 Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).
47 CAL. HEALTH & S.Avy CODE § 10432.
4 8 CAL. HEALTH & SA= CODE § 10433.
4 9 CAL. HEALTH & SrETv CoDE § 10434.50 CAL. HEAH & SA ETY CODE § 10439.
1i The courts have considered the antilapse, CAL. PnoB. CoDE § 92, and pretermitted
heir, CAL. PnoB. CoDE § 90, situations as analogous to intestate succession and have
applied Probate Code § 257 to give the adopted child the same status, in these areas,
as a biological child of the adoptive parents. Estate of Goulart, 222 Cal. App. 2d 808,
35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963) (antilapse); Estate of Carey, 214 Cal. App. 2d 39, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 98 (1963) (preterrmitted heir); Estate of Dillehunt, 175 Cal. App. 2d 464, 346
P.2d 245 (1959) (preternitted heir).
January, 19671 COMMENTS
Taxation Code5 2 contains provisions inconsistent with the Civil and
Probate Code sections discussed above. These provisions are limited
in their recognition of the adoptee's integration into his adoptive
family Because this recognition, or lack of it, varies from one section
to the next they are also internally inconsistent. Section 13307, sub-
divisions (b) and (e), extends the class A status to adoptive descen-
dants when taking as lineal issue of the decedent. Sections 13308 and
13309 literally extend class B or C status to adopted relatives only
where they are descendants of decedent's brother or sister (class B)
or where they are descendants of a brother or sister of decedents
mother or father (class C) Although succeeding to property as an
heir at law under Probate Code section 257, an adoptee not expressly
covered by sections 13308-13309 could be classified as a stranger
while his adoptive brother, succeeding to a share in the same estate,
would be a class B or C transferee.
The State Controller has indicated some areas of conflict which
could arise due to this inconsistency and the holding in Estate of
Zook.53 While adoptive brothers and sisters of an intestate decedent
could be classified as strangers,5" both adopted and biological children
of a natural brother or sister of decedent would be class B transfer-
ees. 55 Also, an adopted brother of decedent's father would be a
cstranger 56 but both the adopted and natural children of the natural
brother or sister of decedent's father would be class C transferees.57
Another possibility is that adopted children can have class A status
52 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 13307-10, 15110-13.
53 Respondent's Petition for a Rehearing, p. 8, Estate of Zook, 62 Cal. 2d 492, 42
Cal. Rptr. 597, 399 P.2d 53 (1965). "All of the prior inheritance tax cases involving the
problem of classification of relatives in case of adoption have involved bequests rather
than intestacy; have held that the inheritance tax law must be construed in par materta
with the laws of succession; and have used words of relationship in their statutory rather
than their common law sense:" Respondents Brief pp. 23-24, Estate of Zook, supra, citing:
Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 468, 74 Pac, 10 (1903); Estate of Rowell, 132 Cal. App.
2d 421, 282 P.2d 163 (1955); Estate of Moms, 56 Cal. App. 2d 715, 133 P.2d 452
(1943).
54 Suppose A is adopted by parents who have two biological children, B and C.
If C dies intestate, A and B could succeed to equal shares of C's estate. Under the
Goulart holding, A could be taxed as a class D transferee while B is a class B transferee.
55 Suppose D dies intestate survived by N, a natural child of D's brother, and M,
an adopted child of the same brother. Both N and M are class B transferees. Although
M can be a class D transferee of his adoptive sibling, he is a class B transferee of his
adoptive uncle.
56 Suppose D dies intestate survived by brothers of his father; A, an adopted
brother, and B, a natural brother. They share equally in D's estate but A can be taxed
as a "stranger" while B is a class C transferee.
57 Suppose D dies intestate survived by children of his father's brother; A, an
adopted child and B, a natural child. These two transferees have class C status, although
again they could be class D transferees of one another.
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when taking from both biological and adoptive ancestorss while in
ascending and collateral lines only blood relations would be given the
favorable classifications.5 9 In whatever manner the classifications are
specifically applied, following the holdings in Estate of Zook and Es-
tate of Goulart, it is apparent that the area of inheritance taxation is
one in which a biological and an adoptive child in the same family
can be treated unequally by the law
The Goulart and Zook cases, so unusual in their fact situations,
make tis inequality apparent. Do these umque situations require
special handling? Should all those adopted out of families they have
known be treated differently than the more usual infant adoptee? A
consistent application of policy directed toward the creation of a
familial relationship giving the adopted child the same status as a
biological child would result in a just handling in the umque as well
as the usual case. Support of this policy by statutory enactments con-
sistent with its objectives would guarantee the application of the doc-
trine of complete transplantation.
The paramount consideration in an adoption proceeding is the
welfare of the child, and complete transplantation must operate to
complement, not to contravene, this objective. Civil Code section 227
requires that the court examine all parties to the adoption to deter-
mine whether "the interest of the child will be promoted by the adop-
tion" before awarding the adopting parents the custody of the child.
The California Supreme Court recognized this principle in Estate of
Santos6 stating: "The main purpose of adoption statutes is the pro-
motion of the welfare of children. -61
This concern for the welfare of the child must take precedence
over other matters in the regulation of adoptive relationships.62
THE POLICY OF COMPLETE TRANSPLANTATION
Professor Richard R. B. Powell, in his treatise on real property,
recommends that American jurisdictions subscribe to the doctrine of
complete transplantation, for the purposes of intestate succession, stat-
ing that "since 1846, the trend as to inheritance has been to transplant
the adopted child from a set of relations to his natural parents and
5 8 The Zook court recognized tins possibility. See note 35 supra and accompanying
text.
50 The Revenue and Taxation Code has no special provision to cover a situation
such as Goulart, where the adoptee is a transferor. The Goulart court decided that a
literal interpretation of the Code results in a favorable classification for biological col-
laterals or ancestors and not for adoptive collaterals or ancestors.
60 185 Cal. 127, 195 Pac. 1055 (1921).
61 Id. at 130, 195 Pac. at 1057.
,
2 In adult adoptions the public interest must be considered as well. CAr.. Civ. CODE:
§ -227 (p).
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kindred into a new set of relations to Ins adoptive parents and kindred,
winch eliminates the relationship flowing from the child's birth.""8
Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor, in his dissent in Estate of
Calhoun,64 advocated the need for transplanting the adopted child
into the adoptive family, stating that "the objective of adoption is the
'consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relation-
ship of parent and child,' in whch the child becomes a member 'to all
intents and purposes of the family of the foster parents'. . "65 The
legislature's response to this dissent was the amendment to Probate
Code section 257, providing for complete transplantation in intestate
succession.
As noted above, the present Probate Code section 257 prevents
the adopted child from succeeding to the estates of hIs biological rela-
tives.6" The majority of American states have not seen fit to sever this
inheritance right.67 Califorma demes this succession in an apparent
contradiction of the requirement that the child's welfare must be pro-
moted by the adoption. But the right of succession in the estates of
biological relatives is terminated in return for the statutory right of
succession in the estates of adoptive relatives. The possible loss is com-
pensated for by the statutory gain. This better rule gives the adopted
child the same succession rights as his adoptive siblings. His welfare
does not require, nor should he be entitled to, the advantage of suc-
cession rights in both families.
The decision in Estate of Zook granted class A tax advantages to
an adopted child, taang under his natural grandmother's will, as
though the child had never been adopted. Ths, without doubt, gives
the adoptee preferential treatment, allowing him the most favorable
exemption under the wills of both adoptive and biological ancestors.
Those related in the same degree to the testatrix left in the natural
line, i.e., the other grandchildren named in the will, cannot claun a
favorable tax status when taking from anyone outside the family re-
lationship. Also, the biological children in the adoptee's new family
receive a beneficial classification only when taking from their biologi-
cal family Is it necessary for "justice" that the adoptee receive this
preference? Would it be unjust to give the adopted child favorable tax
status only within his adoptive family, as is the situation for his adop-
tive brothers and sisters?
The loss of the favorable tax classification when receiving property
686 PoWvrL, REALr PitoPsa1r ff 1004 (1958).
6444 Cal. 2d 378, 282 E2d 880 (1955).
65 Id. at 392, 282 P.2d at 889.
66 "An adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent nor does
such adopted child succeed to the estate of a relative of the natural parent
67 6 PowELL, BR, AL PROPEnTY § 1006 n.53 (1958).
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from the estate of a biological relative is more than compensated for
by the advantages gamed as a result of the adoption. As stated by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court: "The new status is a better one than
the former The [adoption] statute is . intended to help to give
the child as good a chance as children in general have, it was not its
plan to give him a better one.""' Granting an adopted child preferen-
tial treatment, the Zook court suggested that to do otherwise would
"thwart the expression of. . [affection]." 69 But the tax statutes were
not enacted to bar expressions of affection. The favorable classifica-
tions are not assigned on the basis of the amount of affection expressed.
Rather, they are based on the legal familial relationships existing be-
tween a decedent and his transferees.70 Granting class A status is not
a prerequisite to showing affection and regard for a transferee. And,
furthermore, classification as a "stranger" in no way thwarts an ex-
pression of affection.
There is another reason why an adopted child should be granted
the favorable tax classifications only within his adoptive family. The
power of taxation is essential to the state's economic and political
stability.7' And the revenue collected 2 is applied for the benefit of
the general public. 78 A just compromise between the conflicting claims
68 Young v. Bridges, 86 N.H. 135, 142, 165 Ad. 272, 276 (1933).
69 62 Cal. 2d at 495, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 600, 399 P.2d at 56.
70 The relationships ennumerated by Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 13307 and
15110 as criteria for class A status normally involve substantial feelings of mutual af-
fection. Bonds of affection generally do decrease, as does the tax exemption, as one
moves away from the decedent toward the kindred separated in greater degrees. (CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 252-53 explain degrees of consanguinity. A child is related in the first
degree to his parent, siblings are related m the second degree, uncle and nephew in
the third degree, first cousins in the fourth degree and so on.) The tax classifications
therefore parallel the normal degrees of affection shared by kindred. But this does not
mean they are intended to operate in any manner relative to the quantity of affection
felt by the transferor for the recipient of his bounty. Somewhere among the lines recog-
nized for favorable tax rates and exemptions there is a point where affection felt for
persons not kindred of the transferor exceeds the affection felt for those who are his
kindred. It is not unusual for a person to feel more affection for a friend than for a
sibling, and it would be unusual for a decedent to have numbered no friend closer to
him in affection than a cousin. Although parallel at some levels to the quantity of affec-
tion shared, the inheritance tax classifications dearly recognize familial relationship only.
See Estate of Radovich, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957).
71 Watchtower Bible Soc. v. Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 2d 426, 182 P.2d 178
(1947), cert. dened, 332 U.S. 811 (1947); Estate of Elston, 32 Cal. App. 2d 652, 90
P.2d 608 (1939).
72 Revenue collected through inheritance and gift taxes for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1966, has been estimated to be $121,500,000. This compares with state personal
income taxes, collected during the same period, of an estimated $435,300,000. CAr-
romNrA. EcoNoIC DEvELopivNT AGENCY, CAL -OnirA STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT 198
(1965).
78 See People ex rel Attorney General v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232 (1850).
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of the taxpayer and the taxing authority requires that the power to
tax be exercised fairly and rationally There is nothing manifestly fair
or rational about granting an adopted child favorable classifications
in two families.
PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
Chester Vernier, in his treatise on American family laws states that:
[T]he problem of inheritance is of such importance as to call for
an express pronouncement by the legislatures [11n the junsdic-
ions that do deal with the problem the statutes are sketchy, in-
sufficient, and unsatisfactory. Some factual situations are covered, but
others are completely ignored, and the courts are left to struggle with
the incomplete efforts of the legislatures."4
The Zook and Goulart cases are clear examples of the courts struggling
with the incomplete efforts of the California legislature.
Amendments to the Civil Code and the Revenue and Taxation
Code,75 codifying the doctrine of complete transplantation, are needed
to extend the legislature's enactments in this field. These changes
would solidfy the adoptee's status as a legitimate child of the adoptive
family by treating adopted children and biological children as equals
under the law
Civil Code amendments are needed to adopt complete transplan-
tation in place of the present Civil Code policy of parental substitu-
tion. These amendments, to sections 228 and 229, would terminate the
legal relationships of the adoptee and his biological relatives and en-
courage his complete participation in his adoptive family by giving
him legal rights and duties in that family
Amendments to the Revenue and Taxation Code are needed to
provide for a complete correlation of the inheritance tax classifications
with Probate Code section 257 These amendments would recognize
the adoptee's full rights of inheritance in the estates of his adoptive
relatives, and their reciprocal rights in his estate. An addition to sec-
tion 13307 of the Revenue and Taxation Code would extend the class
A status to an adoptive ancestor. Additions to sections 13308 and
13309 would extend class B or C transferee status to all adoptive col-
laterals. Section 13310 should be changed, to preclude a repeat of the
Zook holding, by restricting all transfers between an adoptee and his
biological relatives to class D status.
These statutory amendments would give Calfforma a completely
consistent approach to adoption. Under these statutes an adoption
744 VEnmER AmmCuw FA.mm LAws § 262, at 411 (1936).
75 The proposed statutes are listed m the appendix to tins comment.
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would completely transplant the adopted child into the adopting
family.
Due to the complete severance of rights with the natural family,
the adoption may in some cases cause some hardship to the adoptee.76
This is particularly true where, as in the Zook case, the adopted child
will be the transferee of a substantial bequest from a biological rela-
tive. This is a factor that can be considered in deciding whether the
adoption will be in the best interests of the child. One situation where
the hardship can be partially overcome exists where a testator leaves
part of his estate to a class of kindred and indicates a desire for an
adopted out biological descendant or collateral to share equally in the
transfer. The testator can direct his executors to pay the inheritance
taxes out of the estate before distribution. This will result in the dis-
tribution of equal shares to all members of the class.
CONCLUSION
The proposed statutory amendments, interpreted in relation to
Probate Code section 257, establish and define a new status for the
adopted child. His integration into the adoptive family is complete,
placing him in a situation which is as nearly equivalent to the naturalfamily as the law can establish. His legal status is equal to that of bio-
logical children in his adoptive family This equality of treatment
would be a definite contribution to the welfare of the child and would
be in the public interest as well.
APPENDIX-PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS 77
California Civil Code
§ 228. A child, when adopted, may take the family name of the person
adopting. After adoption, the two shall sustain towards each other the legal
relation of parent and child, and have all the nghts and be sub]ect to all the
duties of that relation. The adopted chilcs -relationship to the adopting
parent's kindred shall be the same as if it were the legitimate child of the
adopting parents.
§ 229. The parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the adoption,
relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the child
so adopted, and have no right over it. The kindred of the adopted child's
parents are no longer legal kindred of the child.
76 The adult adoption is an obvious example. Under the amended statutes an
adopted adult would be a class D transferee from both hIs adoptive and biological
ancestors. The parties contemplating an adoption should be aware of this possible finan-
cial sacrifice and should consider it m deciding whether to go forward with the adoption.
7 Additions to the code sections are indicated by italics, and deletions are indicated
by strikeouts.
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California Revenue and Taxation Code78
§ 13307 "Class A transferee" means any of the following:
(a) A transferee who is the husband; wife, lineal ancestor, or lineal issue
of the decedent. This section shall-include decedents lineal ancestor by
adoption.
(b) A transferee whose relationship to the decedent is thaf of a child
adopted by the decedent In conformity. with the laws of this State, provided
such child was under the age of 21 years at the time of such adoption.
(c) A transferee to whom the decedent for not less than 10 continuous
years prior to the transfer stood in the mutually acknowledged felationslip
-of a parent, if the relationship commenced on or before the transferee's fif-
teenth birthday.
(d) A transferee who is the lineal issue of a child mentioned in sub-
division (b)-or (c).
(e) A transferee whose relationship to the decedent is that of a person
adopted in conformity with the Thws of this State by any lineal issue or child
mentioned in this section; provided, such person was under the age of 21
years at the time of -such adoption.
§ 13308. "Class B transferee" means any of.the following:
(a) A transferee who is the brother, sister, or descendant of a brother or
sister of the decedent.
(b) A transferee who is the wife or widow of a son, or thehusband or
widower of a daughter, of the decedent.
This section shall be construed to include, but shall not be limited to,
adoptive or adopted kindred of the transferor who, by reason of an adoption
in conformity with the laws -of this State, fulfill a stated relationship. For the
purposes of this section "descendant" includes, although it is not limited to,
a child adepted-er acknowledged in conformifty with the laws of this State.
§ 13309. "Class C transferee" means any of the following:
(a) A transferee who is the brother or sister of the father or mother of
the decedent.
(b)A transferee who is fhe descendant of a brotheror sister of the father
or mother of the decedent.
Ths section shall be construed to include, but shall not be limited to,
adoptive or adopted kindred of the transferor who, by reason of an adoption
in conformity with the laws of this State, fulfill a stiited relationship. For the.
purposes of this section "descendant" includes, although it is ndt limited to,
-a child-adepted- e-eacknowledged in conformity with the laws of this State.
§ 13310. "Class D transferee" means any transferee who is not a Class A, B,
or C transferee.
Persons adopted out of their biological family are class D transferees
when taking property as a transferee. of a biological relative. Biological rela-
tives of a transferor who has been. adopted out of his biological family are
class D transferees when taking property in his estate.
7 8 The amendments necessary to change §§ 13307-10 have been indicated. Parallel
amendments are necessary to change §§ 15110-13, defining donee classifications.
